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Freshwater allocation has been a significant issue in New
Zealand, particularly in the rich agricultural regions of 
the South Island, for over a decade, and has given rise to
significant litigation before the superior courts.1 For
example, in the Canterbury region there is competition 
for access to freshwater between agriculture and hydro
electricity generation, and between agricultural users in
terms of their needs for irrigation. In part, this results from
land use change, with the conversion of sheep and beef
farms to dairy farms. During the period 2002–2012 dairy
farming increased by 28 per cent.2
Absent any clear legal or policy direction in the frame-
work Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA), the courts
have been required to determine critical questions regard-
ing the legal effect of resource consents and priority to
scarce freshwater resources between competing applica-
tions. This situation has been hampered by slow progress
in the preparation of national policy statements (NPS) by
the Minister for the Environment, with the NPS regarding
freshwater management only being made operative as
recently as 2011.3 Similarly, progress has also been slow
in terms of regional plan preparation, with ministerial
intervention and special purpose legislation being
required to complete the Canterbury regional plan process
in a timely way.4
This case summary focuses on the legal issues regarding
property rights, non-derogation from grant and legiti-
mate expectation in the context of resource consents for
the take and use of water arising from the recent Court 
of Appeal decision in Hampton v Canterbury Regional
Council.5
EXISTING LAW PRIOR TO HAMPTON
The issue of freshwater allocation came sharply into focus
in Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd.6 The back-
ground to the case was that Meridian held resource
consents relating to its hydroelectricity generation scheme
that allowed it to dam the natural outflow from Lake
Tekapo in the Waitaki catchment in the South Island, and
to divert up to 130 m3 of water per second into a canal for
generation purposes. Aoraki sought resource consent to
take up to 15 m3 of water per second from the lake for
irrigation purposes. It was clear that allowing Aoraki to
take water from the lake would have an adverse effect on
Meridian by reducing the available flow. But the law
under the RMA was uncertain. Did the consents held by
Meridian present an insuperable obstacle to Aoraki, as a
matter of law under the RMA? To decide this question, the
High Court decision in Aoraki considered the nature of
resource consents. For example, does the grant of consent
confer a privilege or a right on the consent holder?
Under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 (re-
pealed and restated by the RMA), the Town and Country
Planning Appeal Board had found that the grant of a water
right did not provide a guarantee for extraction of the
volume of water allowed to be taken. The legal effect of
granting the water right was simply to render lawful what
would otherwise have been unlawful absent the grant 
of consent. Subsequently, in Auckland Acclimatisation
Society Inc v Sutton Holdings Ltd,7 the Court of Appeal
defined water rights as ‘privileges’. Based on the previous
law, Aoraki contended that the legal effect of granting a
water permit under the RMA simply conferred a privilege
on the consent holder, and not an exclusive right that
could be used to prevent other persons from taking or
using freshwater from the same resource.
Meridian, on the other hand, contended that its consents
were not ‘privileges’ or bare licences, but were ‘rights’ that
‘could not be derogated from or diminished by issue of 
a further water permit to a third party’.8 The High Court
was persuaded by the combination of property rights 
and public law arguments put forward by Meridian. Key
matters that influenced the Court’s judgment were the
requirement in section 7(b) of the RMA to have regard to
the efficient use and development of natural and physical
resources, and the concession made by Aoraki that
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allowing it to take water from the lake would ‘devalue’
Meridian’s interest in the water. The Court held that:9
In our judgment, granting a water permit for a particular 
volume of water over a specified period of time commits the
consent authority to that grant in the sense that it is not enti-
tled to deliberately erode the grant unless it is acting pursuant
to specific statutory powers. The relevant factors applying in
this public law context are similar to those underlying non-
derogation of grant. In situations where the consent authority’s
commitment represents a full allocation of the resource . . .
the grantee . . . must reasonably expect to proceed with plan-
ning and investment on the basis that the consent authority
will honour its commitment. Indeed, refusal to recognize that
expectation would seriously undermine public confidence in
the integrity of water permits. (emphasis added)
PROPERTY RIGHTS FOLLOWING HAMPTON
The Court of Appeal decision in Hampton10 concerned
the judicial review of the grant of resource consent for the
take and use of water in the Chertsey groundwater zone in
the Canterbury region of the South Island.
Previously, a series of resource consents had been granted
to Simon Hampton for the purpose of irrigating farms
owned by Simon Hampton and his cousin Robert
Hampton. Notwithstanding the purpose of the consents,
Simon Hampton was the sole consent holder under the
RMA. The water volume allocated for the farm owned 
by Simon Hampton (427,000 m3) had been transferred to
the owners of other land in the same catchment, but
following a disagreement between the cousins the water
volume allocated for irrigating the farm owned by Robert
Hampton (350,000 m3) remained unused. As a result,
Robert Hampton applied for the grant of a separate
resource to take and use the same water volume for the
purpose of irrigating his farm.
In response, Simon Hampton commenced judicial review
proceedings. He contended that the grant of consent for
the same water volume to Robert Hampton (350,000 m3)
would affect his rights to change the consent conditions
either to allow this water volume to be used for the
purposes of irrigating his own farm, or to transfer any
unused water to other landowners in the same catchment.
He asserted that this would result in a financial loss of up
to $560,000. In his view, his cousin should either pay the
market price to access the water or do without. Effectively,
Simon Hampton relied on the Aoraki decision.
The independent commissioner who made the delegated
decision for the regional council was not persuaded by
this argument. He found that the grant of consent would
not reduce the water volume available for irrigating Simon
Hampton’s farm, because the grant of consent to Robert
Hampton effectively represented a ‘re-allocation’ of the
water (350,000 m3) already allocated for irrigating his
land. On review, the High Court was not persuaded that
the grant of consent to Robert Hampton would derogate
from the consent held by Simon Hampton, because:11
n The consent granted to Robert Hampton expressly
recognised the prior consents granted to Simon
Hampton, and included a condition that prevented the
water volume (350,000 m3) from being used by Robert
Hampton in the event that Simon Hampton was able
to use that water volume pursuant to his consent at any
time in the future (if allowed via the change of consent
conditions).
n The condition included on the grant of the consent
held by Simon Hampton, that specified that the dis-
puted water volume (350,000 m3) could only be used
for the purposes of irrigating Robert Hampton’s farm,
had been included at the request of Simon Hampton.
n Whilst the Court acknowledged that Simon Hampton
could apply to the regional council for the change of
consent conditions under section 127 of the RMA to
enable him to use this water volume, it noted that his
application for change of the conditions had been
placed on hold by the regional council at his request.
Any arguments about derogation from the consent held by
Simon Hampton were therefore found to be premature,
and the High Court dismissed the application for judicial
review.12
Court of Appeal decision
The judicial review then came before the Court of Appeal.
The Court noted that in order for Simon Hampton to 
take and use the disputed water volume (350,000 m3) he
would need to obtain further consents under sections 127
and 136 of the RMA. In particular, the Court observed that
any applications for the change of consent conditions or
for the transfer of the water to other persons in the same
catchment would require a full assessment of any environ-
mental effects (including any effects on established acti-
vities), and would also need to comply with any relevant
regional plan provisions.13 Given the discretionary nature
of these consent processes it could not therefore be
‘assumed’ that ‘consent would inevitably’ be granted.14 As
a result, the Court considered that it was ‘unrealistic’ for
Simon Hampton to rely on the doctrine of legitimate
expectation.15
The Court then turned to consider the principle of non-
derogation from grant. It noted that the High Court in
Aoraki found that the grant of unlimited permits would not
be consistent with the comprehensive licensing system
established by the RMA, that the ‘first in time’ rule under
existing case law conferred substantive priority for the
successful applicant to use the resource, that the legal
nature of the right conferred by the resource consent was
‘analogous to a licence coupled with . . . a profit à
prendre’, and that the principle of non-derogation against
grant applied to ‘all legal relationships which confer a
right in property’.16
However, the Court found the previous reasoning in
Aoraki regarding the legal nature of the consent to take
and use water and the application of the non-derogation
from grant principle ‘problematic’ in a resource manage-
ment context. In particular, the Court observed that at
common law there was no property right regarding water,
that statutory rights to control water have been limited
(inter alia) to the right to take and use water which ‘falls
short of providing . . . a property right’ and that section
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122 of the RMA expressly provides that a resource consent
‘is neither real nor personal property’. As a result, the
Court found that the RMA regime conferred only limited
‘property-like rights’ on consent holders – for example, the
ability to register a resource consent under the Protection
of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, to grant a
charge over a consent and to transfer the consent to other
persons ‘in certain circumstances’.17
Overall, the Court found that the RMA ‘did not seek to
create a world in which consents could be freely traded’,
that the ‘market value of a water permit must reflect . . .
the restrictions upon alienation’18 and that the regional
council was not obliged under the RMA to ‘protect the
economic interests’ of consent holders.19 Whilst departing
from Aoraki in these respects, the Court was careful to
emphasise that the ‘first in time’ principle provided ample
justification (in substantive terms) to refuse the grant of
subsequent resource consent applications where the
resource in question has been ‘fully allocated’, and that it
did ‘not suggest the wrong result was reached’ in that
case.20 As a result, the Court held that resource consent
granted to Robert Hampton was appropriately granted and
would not result in any ‘further depletion’ in the Chertsey
groundwater allocation zone.
Supreme Court decision
Subsequently, Simon Hampton sought leave to appeal 
the Court of Appeal decision to the Supreme Court.21 In
particular, he wished to dispute the findings of the Court
of Appeal that the grant of resource consent to Robert
Hampton did not cause ‘any detriment’, and that the grant
of the original resource consent did not confer a ‘property’
right. Specifically, Simon Hampton took issue with the
reasons given by the Court of Appeal regarding its
criticism of the Aoraki decision.22 However, the Supreme
Court did not consider that this issue was a matter of
public importance as the Court of Appeal had clearly
stated that it agreed with the outcome in Aoraki:23
We do not see this issue as justifying the grant of leave. There
is room for debate about the justification for the criticisms of
the Aoraki decision in the Court of Appeal’s judgment in this
case, but, as those criticisms do not undermine the Aoraki
decision itself, we do not consider that a matter of general
importance is raised by this ground.
In relation to the question of priority between the subse-
quent applications made by Robert and Simon Hampton,
the Supreme Court noted that for Simon Hampton to
succeed on this point he: ‘. . . would have to argue that his
application should receive priority despite the fact that he
lodged the application after Robert, had no ability to use
the water allocation at the time the application was made
and voluntarily placed the application on hold for several
years’.24
Whilst the Supreme Court accepted that the Fleetwing
approach to priority had not been fully considered by the
Court, it found that the ‘first in time’ principle was not
‘directly’ engaged in Hampton and thus declined to grant
leave for appeal based on this ground:25
This Court granted leave in an earlier case that placed in issue
the Fleetwing principle, but that case settled before the sub-
stantive appeal had been determined. We accept that this is
an issue of general or public importance. But we do not see
the facts of the present case as directly engaging the Fleetwing
principle and for that reason we do not consider that granting
leave for the purpose of allowing that issue to be argued
would be in the interests of justice in this case.
Finally, the Supreme Court was not persuaded that
legitimate expectation was ‘arguable’ in the context of
Hampton, either in relation to the grant of the subsequent
consent to Robert Hampton or in relation to Simon
Hampton’s ability to change the conditions of the original
consent.26 As a result, leave to appeal was dismissed.
COMMENTARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Successive New Zealand governments have struggled to
establish a coherent legal regime under the RMA for man-
aging freshwater. Despite an ongoing debate facilitated 
by the non-statutory Land and Water Forum since 2009,
recurring issues regarding priority to freshwater allocation
continue to persist. The situation has not been improved
by NPS-FM 2014 owing to the long time-period set for
compliance (31 December 2025), and the need for the
NPS to be transposed by changes to all regional plans.
Whilst the Supreme Court did not need to engage with
property rights, non-derogation from grant or priority for
the allocation of scarce resources raised by the appeal in
Hampton, arguably leaving these issues for determination
on a subsequent occasion is unlikely to add clarity to the
current state of the law. For example, it is clear from both
the approved grounds for appeal and the interim judgment
in Ngai Tahu,27 that the Supreme Court is dissatisfied with
the substantive effect of the Fleetwing priority principle
and that it favours a principled exercise of discretion as
opposed to what was described by Joseph Sax as a
procedural ‘traffic’ rule.28 Similarly, Hammond J observed
in Ngai Tahu at the Court of Appeal stage that there was
no ‘fundamental’ reason why substantive priority should
be decided by applying a procedural rule.29
Finally, Sax also noted the ‘paradox’ that while freshwater
cannot, owing to its physical characteristics be owned,
irrigators and other water users ‘need property-like entitle-
ments’ in freshwater in order to provide for their economic
and social well-being.30 It appears that the Supreme Court
was not entirely convinced by the criticisms levelled at
Aoraki by the Court of Appeal in Hampton. The failure 
to grapple with these issues is a missed opportunity to
nudge informed debate about them ‘in the court of pub-
lic opinion, or in Parliament’.31 Ultimately, substantive
statutory reform will be required.
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